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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Kevin C. Walsh is a Virginia resident and a member of the faculty at the
University of Richmond School of Law. He teaches and writes in the areas of
federal jurisdiction, constitutional law, and complex litigation. Walsh is the author
of a forthcoming essay in the Stanford Law Review presenting previously
unidentified arguments that require dismissal of Virginia’s lawsuit for lack of
jurisdiction.1 These arguments were not presented by either party, despite extensive
briefing below. Nor were they addressed in the District Court’s two thorough
opinions or in appellant’s opening brief in this Court. These heretofore neglected
arguments establish that the federal courts lack statutory subject-matter jurisdiction
over State declaratory judgment actions like this one, and that Virginia’s lawsuit
seeks an advisory opinion outside the bounds of Article III jurisdiction. This brief
presents these arguments and explains why they require reversal and dismissal. 2

1

See Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost that Slew the Mandate, 64 Stanford Law Review
____ (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_
id=1748550 (last visited March 4, 2011).
2

This brief takes no position on the constitutionality of the individual mandate or
on the justiciability of the private-party challenges in the Liberty University case.
No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part. No person or
entity, other than amicus, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation and submission of this brief. The parties have consented to the filing of
this brief. Walsh’s institutional affiliation is noted for identification purposes only.
–1–
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Virginia’s lawsuit relies on a novel vehicle to seek a federal declaratory
judgment: a declaratory state statute designed to carry Virginia into federal court
for a declaratory judgment about the constitutionality of a federal law. Established
Supreme Court precedent requires dismissal of the claim that has been concocted
and carried into court by means of this contrivance.
There are three independent grounds for dismissing Virginia’s lawsuit for
lack of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. First, the Supreme Court has held that
“[t]he situation presented by a State’s suit for a declaration of the validity of state
law is … not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts.”3
This holding requires dismissal of Virginia’s lawsuit, which seeks a declaration
that state law is not preempted by federal law.
Second, the Supreme Court has held that there is no statutory jurisdiction
over a federal declaratory judgment action unless one of the parties to the
declaratory action could have brought a nondeclaratory action about the same issue
against the other party.4 That condition is not met here. Virginia challenges the
individual mandate, a statutory provision not enforceable by the federal
3

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1983).

4

See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 804-05 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the holding of Skelly Oil and
subsequent applications of the Skelly Oil test).
–2–
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government against Virginia. The basis for this challenge is Virginia’s Health Care
Freedom Act, a statute not enforceable by Virginia against the federal government.
Thus neither party could sue the other in federal court in a nondeclaratory action
concerning the enforceability of the individual mandate. There is therefore no
jurisdiction over Virginia’s declaratory judgment action concerning the same issue.
Third, Congress has limited the availability of declaratory relief to “a case of
actual controversy.”5 This is not such a case. Rather, Virginia’s lawsuit amounts to
a request for an advisory opinion about the constitutionality of the individual
mandate. In the guise of a declaratory judgment action about the validity of its
declaratory state statute, Virginia actually seeks a ruling about the law that would
apply if and when there is an actual controversy between the federal government
and a Virginia resident who seeks to avoid the obligation of the individual
mandate.
This last statutory ground for jurisdictional dismissal overlaps with the case
or controversy requirement of Article III.6 As such, it provides a statutory hook for
the Article III standing arguments advanced by the federal government (which are
sound). But because of this overlap, this third statutory ground differs from the
5

28 U.S.C. § 2201.

6

See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (“[T]he phrase
‘case of actual controversy’ in the [Declaratory Judgment] Act refers to the types
of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III.”) (internal
citation omitted).
–3–
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other two in an important respect. Those two grounds enable this Court to order
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without making any constitutional determination.
“It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to the decision of the case.”7 There is no reason to exempt
constitutional determinations under Article III from this salutary practice of
constitutional avoidance.
“Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is … limited to those subjects
encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.”8 It is inconsequential for
resolution of this appeal that the parties have thus far failed to address the absence
of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. “[E]very federal appellate court has a
special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of
the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to
concede it.”9
The jurisdictional analysis requiring dismissal of Virginia’s lawsuit has
significance far beyond this one case.10 Other States have enacted opposition to the

7

Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
8

Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 695, 701 (1982).

9

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).

10

One readily available indicator of its importance can be seen in Judge Vinson’s
decision in Florida v. HHS, which adopted wholesale the jurisdictional analysis for
–4–
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individual mandate into state law, and have done so using the vehicle of a
declaratory state statute they hope to ride into federal court to invalidate the
individual mandate.11 Moreover, health care is just one issue on which some States
are pushing back against the federal government.12
A State cannot interpose itself between its citizens and the federal
government by means of a parens patriae action against the federal government—
as Virginia appropriately conceded below.13 A State is not permitted to accomplish
the same interposition simply by first enacting a declaratory statute to codify
disagreement with federal law before repairing to federal court. Such interposition

state standing from Judge Hudson’s opinion in this case. See Florida v. HHS, ___
F. Supp. 2d ___, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
11

Legal measures opposing various aspects of healthcare reform were introduced
in over 40 state legislatures in 2009 and 2010, and Virginia was just one of seven
states to enact opposition to an individual mandate into state law in 2010. See
Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health
Reforms, 2010-11, National Conference of State Legislatures (last updated
February 22, 2011), at http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906. The other states enacting
a mandate-exemption statute in 2010 were Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana,
Missouri, and Utah. Id.

12

See Tenth Amendment Center, The Tenth Amendment Nullification Movement,
at
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/the-10th-amendment-movement/
(providing resources for tracking state nullification legislation involving firearms
regulation, marijuana laws, and cap and trade, among other issues).
13

Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12 [JA 112] (“Virginia recognizes
that Massachusetts v. Mellon stands for the proposition that States cannot sue the
federal government under parens patriae principles . . . .”).
–5–
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is inconsistent with the constitutional structure of the United States.14 It cannot be
sanctioned by this Court.
ARGUMENT
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Virginia’s lawsuit is outside
both statutory and constitutional limits. Because there is no statutory subject-matter
jurisdiction, however, this Court need not (and therefore should not) reach any
constitutional question of Article III jurisdiction.
I.

There Is No Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
over Virginia’s Lawsuit
Virginia relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (the grant of general federal-question

jurisdiction) and 2201 (the statutory authorization for declaratory relief) for
statutory jurisdiction.15 But the Supreme Court has imposed limits on the ability of
federal courts to grant declaratory relief under § 2201, and has incorporated these
limits as jurisdictional limitations into § 1331.16 The most directly applicable limit
14

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404 (1819) (“The Government of the
Union . . . is, emphatically and truly, a Government of the people. In form and in
substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”).
15

Compl. at 3 [JA 30].

16

Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 18 (“Having interpreted the Declaratory
Judgment Act of 1934 to include certain limitations on the jurisdiction of federal
district courts to entertain declaratory judgment suits, we should be extremely
hesitant to interpret the Judiciary Act of 1875 and its 1887 amendments [i.e., the
general grant of federal question jurisdiction] in a way that renders the limitations
in the later statute nugatory.”).
–6–
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is set forth in Franchise Tax Board, which forecloses certain federal declaratory
judgment actions brought by States.17 Another limit is set forth in Skelly Oil, which
applies to all federal declaratory judgment actions.18 Each independently requires
dismissal.
A.

Franchise Tax Board Requires Dismissal

The Supreme Court held in Franchise Tax Board that “[t]he situation
presented by a State’s suit for a declaration of the validity of state law is … not
within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts.”19 This holding
simply and squarely forecloses federal jurisdiction in this lawsuit, in which
Virginia asks the court to “declare that [Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act] is a
17

See id. at 21-22.

18

See Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671-72.

19

Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21-22. In Franchise Tax Board, a California
agency filed a claim in state court (which was later removed into federal court) to
secure a declaration that California tax law was not preempted by ERISA. Id. at 57. The Supreme Court had previously interpreted the federal Declaratory Judgment
Act to include certain limits on federal jurisdiction over declaratory judgment
actions filed in federal court. Id. at 14-22. To prevent circumvention of those limits
through removal of a state court action, the Court determined that the limitations it
had previously found in the federal Act would also apply whenever a litigant
sought to bring a state declaratory judgment action into federal court. See id. at 1819. Because removal jurisdiction is co-extensive with original jurisdiction, the
Court’s holding applies not only to cases removed into federal court, but also to
those filed there originally. See id. Most important for present purposes, the Court
in Franchise Tax Board did more than simply expand the category of actions
covered by prior limitations on federal declaratory judgments. The Supreme Court
imposed a new limitation on jurisdiction that applies when a State seeks
declaratory relief under § 2201. See id. at 21-22.
–7–

Case: 11-1057

Document: 35-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 14

valid exercise of state power.”20 As the district court noted (in the course of
analyzing a different point), the primary objective of Virginia’s federal declaratory
judgment lawsuit is to determine the validity of Virginia law.21
The Court explained in Franchise Tax Board that allowing federal
jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits by States seeking to validate state laws
would be “removed from the spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district
court jurisdiction that informed” its earlier interpretations of the Declaratory
Judgment Act.22 The underlying dispute in Franchise Tax Board was over a
purported conflict between ERISA and state tax law.23 But the Court did not limit
the formulation of its holding to foreclosing federal jurisdiction over only those
kinds of disputes, and that holding requires dismissal here.24

20

Compl. at 6 [JA 33].

21

Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010) (explaining that
the “primary articulated objective” of the lawsuit is “to defend the Virginia Health
Care Freedom Act from the conflicting effect of an allegedly unconstitutional
federal law”).
22

Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21-22.

23

Id. at 4-7.

24

Cf. Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 112 F.3d
1332, 1336 (8th Cir. 1997) (“There is a minor distinction between Franchise Tax
Board and the instant case: that case involved a conflict between a federal statute
and a state statute, while the case at bar presents a conflict between the federal
Constitution and state administrative action. Nevertheless, we see no reason why
the Franchise Tax Board holding should not apply to the case before us.”).
–8–
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In addition to the declaratory relief foreclosed by Franchise Tax Board,
Virginia also asks for “such further and additional relief as the ends of justice may
require including an injunction against the enforcement of § 1501 in particular and
PPACA as a whole.” Id. As this wording reveals, the request for an injunction is
ancillary to the request for declaratory relief. A court cannot reach the additional
remedy of an injunction without first making the declaration of state-law validity
that Franchise Tax Board holds to be beyond the jurisdiction granted by Congress
in § 1331. Consequently, Virginia’s claim for the “further and additional relief” of
an injunction cannot be independently salvaged from its fatally flawed claim for
declaratory relief.25
Some scholars have suggested that Franchise Tax Board can be understood
as a kind of abstention decision.26 To resist application of Franchise Tax Board,
then, Virginia might argue that the rationale of the rule does not apply because,
unlike the claim at issue in Franchise Tax Board, there is no state court with
authority to issue the relief Virginia seeks. This distinction is a real one. Yet it
provides even more of a reason to apply the rule of Franchise Tax Board and
dismiss Virginia’s lawsuit. The tax law at issue in Franchise Tax Board imposed

25

Additionally, as explained in more detail below, the federal court lacks Article
III jurisdiction to issue the requested injunction.

26

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 810-11 (6th ed. 2009).
–9–
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obligations on individuals whom the state could then pursue in a state-court
collection action or at least name as proper defendants in a state-court declaratory
judgment action.27 By contrast, there is no state-court action that Virginia could
bring to enforce its Health Care Freedom Act. To ask a Virginia court to opine on
such a law’s validity in the absence of a proper defendant would be to request a
forbidden advisory opinion.28 Moving the same claim into federal court and adding
the Secretary as a nominal defendant does not render the resulting opinion any less
advisory.29
In sum, Franchise Tax Board forecloses statutory subject-matter jurisdiction
over a State’s declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of a law that a
27

See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21 (explaining that States “have a variety of
means by which they can enforce their own laws in their own courts”).
28

See, e.g., Fairfax v. Shanklin, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (Va. 1964) (“[T]he courts
are not constituted, and the declaratory judgment statute was not intended to vest
them with authority, to render advisory opinions, to decide moot questions or to
answer inquiries which are merely speculative.”).

29

This line of analysis also explains why Franchise Tax Board provides no support
for Virginia even if it is interpreted as a decision that involves an element of
deference to state forum preferences. Whatever such deference Franchise Tax
Board might be thought to embody, Virginia cannot get around the ultimately
advisory nature of its claims. See infra Section II. Moreover, if the District Court
was wrong about the “declaratory nature” of the state law, and there existed some
way in which it could be enforced against a person who sought to impose an
obligation on a Virginia citizen to purchase insurance, this would still not aid
Virginia’s attempt to distinguish Franchise Tax Board. In such a case, Virginia
would be acting to protect a particular individual using a parens patriae theory,
which Virginia has appropriately acknowledged is unavailable to support its suit
against the United States. Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12 [JA 112].
– 10 –
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State actually could enforce in court. It would make little sense to interpret the
precedent nevertheless to allow for jurisdiction over a State’s declaratory judgment
action to determine the validity of a state law that cannot serve as the basis of a
state-court enforcement action. Franchise Tax Board cannot be meaningfully
distinguished; it requires dismissal of Virginia’s lawsuit.
B.

Skelly Oil Requires Dismissal

The Supreme Court’s decision in Skelly Oil also requires dismissal of
Virginia’s lawsuit. The Skelly Oil approach to § 2201 allows federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction over only those actions in which either the declaratory
judgment plaintiff or the declaratory judgment defendant could have brought a
nondeclaratory action against the other party concerning the same issue.30 Put
another way, federal jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action brought under
§ 2201 “depends on the answer to a hypothetical question: had the Declaratory
Judgment Act not been enacted, would there have been a nondeclaratory action (i)
concerning the same issue, (ii) between the same parties, (iii) that itself would have
been within the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction?”31

30

See Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671 (stating that the Declaratory Judgment Act
“enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend
their jurisdiction”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 804-05 (6th ed. 2009).
31

Fallon, et al., supra, at 804.
– 11 –
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Here, the answer to that hypothetical question is plainly “no.” Virginia
possesses no right to nondeclaratory relief against the Secretary’s enforcement of
the individual mandate. Virginia may not seek an injunction prohibiting the
Secretary’s enforcement of the individual mandate against its citizens because that
would be a parens patriae action forbidden by Massachusetts v. Mellon.32 Nor may
Virginia seek an injunction prohibiting the Secretary’s enforcement of the
individual mandate against Virginia: the individual mandate is not enforceable
against Virginia, only against individuals.33
Injunctions do not run against statutes, but against actors. According to the
Supreme Court, “[i]f a case for preventive relief be presented, the court enjoins, in
effect, not the execution of the statute, but the acts of the official, the statute
32

262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923).

33

See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501 (imposing minimum insurance coverage
requirement on “applicable individuals”); Mem. of D. in Support of Mot. to
Dismiss at 1 [JA 49] (“[T]he only provision Virginia challenges in this litigation –
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), which
requires individuals either to obtain a minimum level of health insurance or to pay
a penalty if they do not – will impose no obligations on the Commonwealth, even
after the law takes effect some four years from now. The provision applies only to
individuals, not the state government.”); id. at 12 [JA 60] (stating that the
individual mandate provision “does not impose any obligations whatsoever on
Virginia as a state”); Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 18-19 [JA 11819] (“As Secretary Sebelius concedes, Virginia will not be required to pay the
penalty for failure to meet the Individual Mandate. . . . Virginia will incur no direct
financial liability under the challenged penalty provision.”); Virginia v. Sebelius,
702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that Virginia is “a sovereign
entity not required to purchase insurance under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act”).
– 12 –
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notwithstanding.”34 Virginia accepts this basic principle.35 But once this principle
is applied to the individual mandate, Virginia’s inability to seek injunctive relief
against the Secretary’s enforcement of that law against Virginia is clear. The
reason is simple: If the Secretary can take no action against Virginia pursuant to
the individual mandate, there is no basis for a federal court to enjoin “the acts of
the official, the statute notwithstanding.”36 As already mentioned, and as its
popular name suggests, the “individual mandate” does not apply to Virginia—only
to individuals.
Because Virginia’s lawsuit cannot satisfy the Skelly Oil test, it is not within
the statutory subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. This Court should
order dismissal for that independent reason.
II.

Virginia’s Lawsuit Is Not “a Case of Actual
Controversy”
If this Court concludes that either Franchise Tax Board or Skelly Oil

requires dismissal for lack of statutory jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to reach a
determination about Article III jurisdiction. But if this Court concludes that neither
of these precedents bars Virginia’s lawsuit, the Court still should order dismissal—

34

Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488.

35

Compl. at 7 [JA 34] (requesting “an injunction against the enforcement of
§ 1501 in particular and PPACA as a whole”) (emphasis added).

36

Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488.
– 13 –

Case: 11-1057

Document: 35-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 20

because Virginia’s lawsuit does not present a justiciable case or controversy under
Article III. Rather, Virginia seeks an advisory opinion regarding the
constitutionality of the individual mandate and the validity of its Health Care
Freedom Act.
A.

Virginia Seeks an Advisory Opinion

To ensure that the Declaratory Judgment Act would not enable courts to
exceed the bounds of Article III, Congress made this remedy available only in “a
case of actual controversy.”37 This statutory language is to be interpreted as coextensive with the case or controversy limitation of Article III.38 This Court should
order dismissal because Virginia’s action is an attempt to obtain an advisory
opinion in the absence of a justiciable case or controversy.
For there to be an “actual controversy” cognizable under the Declaratory
Judgment Act and Article III, a dispute must be “definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”39 The dispute must

37

28 U.S.C. § 2201.

38

See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (“[T]he
phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the [Declaratory Judgment] Act refers to the
types of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III.”)
(internal citation omitted).
39

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); see also id. at 23940 (“The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to ‘cases of actual
controversy,’ manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is operative
only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense.”).
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“admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.”40 By these standards, Virginia has failed to present a justiciable
controversy.
Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act imposes no legal obligation, but instead
purports to create an immunity from being legally obligated to buy insurance.41
Presumably, Virginia’s interest lies in seeing that this immunity is given effect in
preference to the federal mandate. But both the federal mandate and the state
immunity relate to the legal obligations of individuals, not the State, vis-à-vis the
federal government. In essence, Virginia seeks a ruling about what law would
apply if and when there is an actual controversy between the federal government
and a Virginia resident over the individual mandate. Virginia is not a necessary
party to such a controversy.42 The present action is nothing more than an attempt to
obtain an advisory opinion in advance of such an actual controversy.43

40

Id.; see also MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 127 (adopting the foregoing
descriptions of the meaning of “actual controversy”).
41

See Va. Code § 38.2-3430.1. (“No resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall be
required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage . . . .”); see
also Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that
the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act is of “a declaratory nature”).

42

Virginia would, of course, have an interest that would suffice under Rule 24 to
allow it to intervene to defend its law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24; Diamond v. Charles,
476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986). But a right to defend a state law attacked in an existing
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The Supreme Court has long forbidden this sort of litigation. Texas v. ICC,44
New Jersey v. Sargent,45 and Georgia v. Stanton,46 are all examples of cases in
which a State claimed that a particular exercise of federal legislative authority was
beyond the federal government’s power. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court
held that a State’s simple request for such a ruling “does not present a case or
controversy within the range of the judicial power as defined by the
Constitution.”47 Yet that is precisely what Virginia’s lawsuit seeks. The lawsuit

case is not equivalent to a right to use that state law to generate a case or
controversy to attack conflicting federal law.
43

Cf. Intl. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Los Angeles, 611 F. Supp. 315, 318
(D.C. Cal. 1986) (“The Court has not discovered, nor have the parties cited, a
single case brought by a state, city or federal government seeking, before the law is
enforced, a declaratory judgment that a law is constitutional, with the exception of
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). Muskrat established the
longstanding precedent that a federal court will not, before the law is applied,
declare laws to be constitutional, because by doing so the court would issue
advisory opinions.”).

44

258 U.S. 158 (1922).

45

269 U.S. 328 (1926).

46

73 U.S. 50 (1868).

47

Texas, 258 U.S. at 162; see also id. (describing as “an abstract question of
legislative power” the question of whether the matters addressed in the challenged
legislation “fall within the field wherein Congress may speak with constitutional
authority, or within the field reserved to the several States”); New Jersey, 269 U.S.
at 334 (dismissing a State’s bill in equity upon concluding that “its real purpose is
to obtain a declaration that in making certain parts of the Federal Water Power Act
… Congress exceeded its own authority and encroached on that of the state”); id.
(“[T]he bill does not show that any right of the State, which in itself is an
appropriate subject of judicial cognizance, is being, or about to be, affected
prejudicially by the application or enforcement of the Act.”); Georgia, 73 U.S. at
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does not deal with the adverse legal relations of Virginia and the federal
government. Indeed, it cannot: the individual mandate is not enforceable by the
federal government against Virginia. Rather, Virginia’s lawsuit deals with
competing claims “of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government”48 that
are not within judicial cognizance in this lawsuit.49
B.

The Cases Relied upon by Virginia Involve Obligations Imposed on
States or Their Officers, or Interference with Some Particular Activity
of the State Itself

The District Court concluded that Virginia had standing.50 Its justiciability
analysis was incomplete, however, given that it did not address: (1) statutory
subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) advisory opinion caselaw, or (3) redressability of
Virginia’s claimed injury. Moreover, the cases relied upon by the District Court
and Virginia in support of Virginia’s standing are distinguishable.
Virginia has described the Texas and New Jersey cases as presenting
situations in which State claims were “abstract because no right of [the] State was

76 (dismissing bill in equity for lack of jurisdiction because “the rights in danger
… must be rights of person or property, not merely political rights, which do not
belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity”).
48

Georgia, 73 U.S. at 77.

49

This is not to say, of course, that the constitutionality of the individual mandate
is entirely beyond the purview of the federal courts. A private-party suit such as
Liberty University v. Geithner presents distinct justiciability questions about which
this brief expresses no opinion.
50

See Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 598, 607 (E.D. Va. 2010).
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being or about to be affected.”51 And Virginia has sought to escape classification of
its claim with these non-justiciable claims by pointing to its Health Care Freedom
Act. But all of the cases that Virginia has identified in which States have been able
to sue the federal government to avoid preemption involve obligations imposed on
States or their officers, or interference with some particular activity of the State
itself.
In seeking to establish its standing before the District Court, Virginia cited
cases involving provisions of federal law that imposed obligations directly on the
State or governmental officers within the State.52 Because the individual mandate
imposes no such obligation, however, these cases provide no support for
concluding that Virginia’s challenge to the individual mandate is justiciable.
Virginia also cited, and the District Court relied on, a different set of equally
distinguishable cases: lawsuits brought by States challenging federal agency action
under federal statutory regimes providing an explicit cause of action to challenge

51

Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12 [JA 112].

52

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997) (addressing
constitutionality of federal statute that purported to “direct state law enforcement
officers to participate … in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory
scheme”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992) (addressing
constitutionality of federal statute that forced upon States the choice of “either
accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of
Congress”).
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that action, such as the Administrative Procedure Act.53 These cases differ from
Virginia’s lawsuit in three important ways. First, the States in those cases relied on
statutes other than the Declaratory Judgment Act to bring their claims.54 Second,
by virtue of the way in which the various statutory causes of action were defined,
those cases involved the legality of a particular action by an agency of the federal
government that had interfered with some particular activity of the State itself
(such as issuing permits, promulgating regulations, or undertaking enforcement
actions).55 Third, by virtue of the particularized nature of these matters, they

53

See Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07 (citing Alaska v. U .S. Dep’t
of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and Wyoming ex rel. Crank v.
United States, 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008)); Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to
Dismiss at 16 [JA 116] (citing Alaska, 868 F.2d at 443-45, Texas Ofc. of Pub. Util.
Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir. 1999), Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
766 F.2d 228. 232-33 (6th Cir. 1985), and Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242).
54

See Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242-44 (engaging in judicial review of ATF
determination pursuant to APA section 704, which states that “[a]gency action
made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review”); Texas, 183 F.3d at 405
(engaging in judicial review of final orders of the Federal Communications
Commission pursuant to the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), and 28
U.S.C. §§ 2342 and 2344); Alaska, 868 F.2d at 444-45 (engaging in judicial review
of orders of the Department of Transportation pursuant to the APA and the
Aviation Act, which includes “a body politic” or a “representative thereof” within
the class of persons entitled to judicial review); Ohio, 766 F.2d at 232-33
(engaging in judicial review of a regulation and interpretive rule pursuant to the
APA and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act).
55

See Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1238-44 (concluding that State could challenge ATF
determination regarding the legal effect of concealed weapons permits issued by
the State); Texas, 183 F.3d at 408-09 (describing challenges to order setting terms
of state regulatory and enforcement authority over various aspects of
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Case: 11-1057

Document: 35-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 26

involved an adverse officer or agency whose action could be declared void or
enjoined to redress the injury that the federal government’s particular challenged
action had inflicted on the State.56 None of these features is present in this case.
Virginia has no statutory basis for judicial review apart from the Declaratory
Judgment Act; it complains of no particular agency action that could be directed
against it; and the relief that it seeks could not, in any event, redress its asserted
injury. The first two of these points have already been established above. The next
section addresses the third point, that Virginia’s asserted injury is not redressable
by the District Court.
C.

Virginia’s Asserted Injury Is Not Redressable by the District Court

There is no way for the District Court to redress Virginia’s asserted injury to
its sovereignty without allowing Virginia to assume the forbidden status of parens
patriae vis-à-vis the federal government.57 “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate
standing separately for each form of relief sought.”58 Yet Virginia has no standing
to seek the relief of an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the mandate against
telecommunications); Alaska, 868 F.2d at 442-43 (explaining
Department of Transportation orders interfered with State
deceptive advertising laws against tour operators); Ohio, 766
(describing federal regulations that prohibited enforcement of
requiring prenotification for shipments of hazardous materials).
56

See note 55 supra.

57

See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923).

58

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).
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its citizens, because (as Virginia appropriately conceded below) “States cannot sue
the federal government under parens patriae principles.”59 A State’s suit to protect
its citizens from the operation of federal law is, of course, nothing but a parens
patriae action.60
Nor can Virginia get around this justiciability problem by relying on the
declaratory relief it seeks. That relief would not redress Virginia’s purported injury
even if the District Court had statutory subject-matter jurisdiction to order it.
Indeed, Judge Hudson’s declaration that the individual mandate is unconstitutional
had no binding legal effect on anyone subject to the individual mandate, whether in
Virginia or elsewhere. The two ways it could have had a binding legal effect are as
a matter of precedent or of preclusion. Yet a district court decision has no
precedential effect.61 And as a matter of preclusion, the judgment binds only the
59

Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12 [JA 112].

60

See Mellon, 262 U.S., at 485 (describing parens patriae suits initiated by a State
against the United States as “judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United
States from the operation of the statutes thereof”).
61

See F.T.C. v. Tarriff, 584 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“district court
decision binding on no court”); Midlock v. Apple Vacations West, Inc., 406 F.3d
453, 458 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]s we have noted repeatedly, a district court decision
does not have stare decisis effect; it is not a precedent.”); Threadgill v. Armstrong
World Industries, Inc., 928 F.3d 1366, 1371 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Even where the
facts of a prior district court case are, for all practical purposes, the same as those
presented to a different district court in the same district, the prior resolution of
those claims does not bar reconsideration by this Court of similar contentions. The
doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district court judge to follow the
decision of another.”).
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parties.62 That binding effect does not amount to much here given that the sole
party challenging the individual mandate is a party against whom it could not be
enforced. Importantly, no nonparty litigant (such as Liberty University, the two
individual plaintiffs in that case, or any other Virginia resident who might wish to
invoke Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act) could take advantage of the District
Court’s declaratory judgment through the doctrine of non-mutual offensive issue
preclusion. That doctrine is unavailable against the federal government.63
These redressability problems, taken together with the features of this
lawsuit that distinguish it from the cases relied upon below, amount in the end to
the same problem analyzed in the advisory opinion section above. Simply put,
Virginia’s lawsuit does not present an “actual controversy” within the meaning of
the Declaratory Judgment Act or Article III. The dispute does not “‘admi[t] of
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”64

62

See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008) (“[W]e have often
repeated the general rule that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made
a party by service of process.”) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
63

See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1984).

64

MedImmune , Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007), quoting Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
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CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding all the attention Virginia’s lawsuit has received and all the
speculation it has engendered, it is not difficult to resolve. There is no statutory
subject-matter jurisdiction over Virginia’s lawsuit for three independent reasons.
First, Virginia seeks a declaration of the validity of state law, but the Supreme
Court has held that “[t]he situation presented by a State’s suit for a declaration of
the validity of state law is … not within the original jurisdiction of the United
States district courts.”65 Second, the Supreme Court has held that there is no
statutory jurisdiction over a federal declaratory judgment action unless either the
declaratory judgment plaintiff or the declaratory judgment defendant could have
brought a nondeclaratory action concerning the same issue against the other
party.66 Yet the individual mandate is not enforceable by the federal government
against Virginia, and Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act is not enforceable by
Virginia against the federal government; these parties consequently cannot bring
nondeclaratory actions against each other concerning the enforceability of the
individual mandate. Third, Virginia’s lawsuit presents no actual controversy under
the Declaratory Judgment Act or Article III.

65

Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21-22.

66

See Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671-72; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart &
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 805 (6th ed. 2009).
– 23 –

Case: 11-1057

Document: 35-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 30

Because there is no statutory or Article III jurisdiction over Virginia’s
lawsuit, amicus curiae respectfully requests that the Court vacate the order of the
District Court and remand with instructions to dismiss.
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